Dr. G. F. Haddad
ibn Abi Bakr ibn Sa‘d, Shams al-Din Abu ‘Abd Allah al-Zur‘i al-Dimashqi
al-Hanbali, known as Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751). A
specialist in Qur’anic commentary, hadith, fiqh
and its principles, Arabic philology and grammar, and the foremost disciple of
Taqi al-Din Abu al-‘Abbas Ahmad ibn ‘Abd al-Halim ibn Taymiyya al-Harrani
(d. 728), whose anthropomorphic and anti-madhhab
teachings he helped perpetuate. Ibn Taymiyya had suggested that Allah was a
corporeal entity in writings such as al-‘Aqida
al-Hamawiyya, al-‘Aqida al-Wasitiyya,
and al-Ta’sis al-Radd ‘ala Asas al-Taqdis.
Here and in other works he indicates that Allah’s “Hand,” “Foot” (qadam),
“Shin” (sâq), “Face” (wajh),
and “Elevation” (‘uluw) are
literal (haqîqi) attributes, and
that He is upon the Throne “in person” (bi
al-dhât), a phrase which his student al-Dhahabi frequently condemns as
innovated in the Religion.
Ibn Taymiyya’s error was in believing such Attributes to be literal, and
declaring as nullifiers-of-the-Attributes (mu‘attila)
all the Ahl al-Sunna who believed
them to be metaphorical. These are among his unwarranted innovations in faith
which Shaykh al-Islam Taqi al-Din al-Subki (d. 756) refuted in his al-Durra
al-Mudiyya and al-Rasa’il al-Subkiyya
fi al-Radd ‘ala Ibn Taymiyya. Al-Sakhawi in al-Tawbikh
(p. 61) noted: “Certain people gave rise to disavowal and a general
reluctance to make use of their knowledge despite their stature in knowledge,
pious scrupulosity, and asceticism. The reason for this was the looseness of
their tongues and their tactlessness in blunt speech and excessive criticism,
such as Ibn Hazm and Ibn Taymiyya, who were subsequently tried and harmed.”
Ibn Qayyim followed the same path as his teacher in his infamous poem
entitled al-Qasida al-Nuniyya (“Ode
Rhyming in the Letter N”). This lengthy poem on the tenets of faith is filled
with corrupt suggestions about the divine Attributes, which Subki analyzes in
detail in his al-Sayf al-Saqil fi al-Radd
‘ala Ibn Zafil (“The Burnished Sword in Refuting Ibn Zafil” i.e.
Ibn al-Qayyim). Subki gives the verdict that the anthropomorphisms of the
Divinity in the poem are beyond the pale of Islam. The poem could not be openly
circulated in Ibn al-Qayyim’s lifetime but only secretly, and it seems that he
never abandoned it, for the Hanbali historian Ibn Rajab heard it from its author
in the year of his death as stated in his Dhayl
Tabaqat al-Hanabila (2:448).
Today, some “Salafi” followers quote this poem indiscriminately,
heedless of the deviations it promotes. Shaykh Nuh Keller observed:
peculiarity the poem shares with some of Ibn al-Qayyim’s other works on
Islamic faith is that it presents the reader with a false dilemma, namely that
one must either believe that Allah has eyes, hands, a descending motion, and
so forth, in a literal (haqîqi)
sense, or else one has nullified (‘attala)
or negated these Attributes. And this is erroneous, for the literal is that
which corresponds to an expression’s primary lexical sense as ordinarily
used in a language by the people who speak it, while the above words are
clearly intended otherwise, in accordance with the [Qur’anic] verse (There is nothing whatsoever like unto Him)
(42:11), for if the above were intended literally, there would be innumerable
things like unto Him in such respect as having eyes, hands, motion, and so
forth, in the literal meaning of these terms. The would-be dilemma is also far
from the practice of the early Muslims, who used only to accept such [Qur’anic]
verses and hadiths as they have come, consigning the knowledge of what is meant
by them – while affirming the absolute Transcendence of Allah Most High
above any resemblance to created things – to Allah Most High alone, without
trying to determinately specify how they are meant (bi
lâ kayf), let alone suggesting people understand them literally (haqîqatan) as Ibn al-Qayyim tried to do.
While granting that his other scholarly achievements are not
necessarily compromised by his extreme aberrances in tenets of faith, it
should not be forgotten that depicting the latter as a “reform” or “return
to early Islam” represents a blameworthy innovation on his part that appeared
more than seven centuries after the time of the Prophet, Allah bless and greet
him, and his Companions. A particularly unsavory aspect of it is that in his
attempts to vindicate the doctrine, Ibn al-Qayyim casts aspersions upon the
Islam of anyone who does not subscribe to it, at their forefront the Ash‘ari
school, whom his books castigate as Jahmiyya or Mu‘attila,
implying, by equating them with the most extreme factions of the Mu‘tazilites,
that they deny any significance to the Divine Attributes, a misrepresentation
that has seen a lamentable recrudescence in parts of the Muslim world today.
“Book of the Soul” (Kitab al-Ruh)
ranks among the best books on the subject of the Islamic understanding of life
after death according to the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the doctrine of the Salaf
and the Four Imams, establishing without doubt that the dead hear the living and
know of them. Since this hearing of the dead is a contradiction of the fundamental
Wahhabi tenet that the dead cannot hear the living, mumblings are sometimes
heard about the authenticity of his authorship of the book among the
However, the book is undoubtedly by Ibn al-Qayyim and is attributed to him by
over two dozen scholars both in his time and after.
It also contains internal proofs of his authorship, such as his mention of his
own book – now lost – entitled Ma‘rifa
al-Ruh wa al-Nafs
and his identifying two of his direct teachers as Abu al-Hajjaj (al-Mizzi), and
“Our shaykh Abu al-Hajjaj, the hadith master, used to say that.”
“I heard Shaykh al-Islam, Ibn Taymiyya stress this…”
said: ‘The sun itself does not descend from the heaven, and the sunrays that
are on earth are neither the sun nor its attribute, but an accident (‘arad)
caused by the sun and the mass (jirm)
This is taken verbatim from Ibn Taymiyya’s notorious “Explanation of the
hadith of Allah’s descent.”
internal proof of Ibn al-Qayyim’s authorship of Kitab al-Ruh is his lapsing into excessive criticism of Ash‘aris
and misattributions of spurious positions to them as is typical of his school,
although in much of his book he cites from al-Tadhkira,
a book by the Ash‘ari scholar al-Qurtubi.
violently attacked imitation (taqlîd)
of the four schools of Law among traditional Sunni Muslims and voiced his anti-madhhab
stance in a two-volume work on the principles of the Law entitled I‘lam
al-Muwaqqi‘in. In the latter book he rejects the evidence that the Companions
and great Imams endorsed imitation as inapplicable to later generations and
instead advocates a kind of populist ijtihâd
in which every Muslim is his own imam and is urged to apply his or her own mind
toward interpreting the Qur’an and Sunna independently, untrammelled by
the burdensome qualifications in jurisprudence, language, hadith methodology,
and the Qur’anic sciences that are required for ijtihâd. It is enough refutation of this Islamically-veiled
Protestantism that Ibrahim al-Nakha‘i said: “If the Companions made ablution
to the wrists I swear I would have done the same, even as I read the verse of
ablution as stating [to
More explicitly, al-Shatibi said: “The fatwas of the mujtahids are to the laymen what the Shari‘a evidences are to the mujtahids.”
The Indian jurist and hadith scholar Habib Ahmad al-Kiranawi blasted Ibn al-Qayyim’s
theses in a 100-page epistle entitled al-Din al-Qayyim
in which he states:
He [Ibn al-Qayyim] also said: “Your claim that the imitator (muqallid) is closer to being right by imitating those who are
more knowledgeable than he is, than by exerting his own reasoning (ijtihâd)
is an empty claim. For the muqallid is
like a blind man who does not know whether what fell into his hand is a stick or
a viper. Whereas he who leaves taqlîd
is a mujtahid who has two rewards if
he is correct and one reward if he is incorrect. How then can the blind man’s
being right and his supposed reward compare with the seeing man’s being right,
who exerts every effort?”
The ignorance, inanity, arrogance, and hostility of the preceding words
are not hidden to anyone. For he has equated the muqallid
with a blind man and the one who leaves taqlîd
with a seeing man although the latter is blinder than the muqallid. If sight consisted in leaving taqlîd it would follow that he who most assiduously follows his own
opinion must be the most sighted of people, for he is as far from imitation as
can be. And if taqlîd were blindness
then the most assiduous follower of the Messenger of Allah, Allah bless and
greet him, would be the blindest of people, for he is a pure imitator! Whereas
the sighted one sees the truth as does the imitator, while the blind one does
not see it, nor does the one who leaves imitation, following his own guidance
despite the fact that he is blind and castigating anyone who might imitate the
sighted and follow the latter’s guidance.
As for exerting every effort, if reward depended on exerting every effort
in absolute terms then the muqallid
has exerted every effort toward following the truth, having realized that he is
incapable to do more than to imitate the knowledgeable person. How then could
he be committing a sin and be deprived of reward? But if reward depended on
exerting every effort in other than absolute terms then how could he who leaves taqlîd,
be rewarded when he is cutting wood in the dead of night? Is this anything but
Whoever knows the conditions for being qualified to give legal responses
in Allah’s Religion according to the statements of Ahmad ibn Hanbal,
and Ibn al-Mubarak,
does not doubt at all that those who leave taqlîd
without having achieved those conditions are not allowed to give fatwa on the
basis of their opinion and what they have understood of the Book and the Sunna.
The reason is that their knowledge is virtually no knowledge. This is a far cry
from possessing sight and obtaining reward while being wrong. For theirs is only
the bane of the ijtihâd of the non-mujtahid.
He [Ibn al-Qayyim] also said: “The muqallid
is closer to being right only when he knows that the correct position is with
the one he is imitating exclusively of others. At that time he is not a muqallid
for him but a follower of the evidence (muttabi‘
But if he does not know this at all, then how can you claim that he is closer to
being right than he who has exerted his every effort and applied all his
strength in searching for the truth?”
This objection is spurious because the reason that the muqallid is closer to being right is that he is led by the guidance
of his imam who is a mujtahid. His
being right is through his imam’s being right, and his being wrong is through
his imam’s being wrong. This is other than the one who leaves taqlîd,
whose being right is through his own person’s being right, and whose being
wrong is through his own person’s being wrong. Now the error of the mujtahid
is less probable than that of the non-mujtahid
just as his being correct is more probable than that of the non-mujtahid.
It follows that the muqallid is closer
to being right than the one who leaves taqlîd
as is readily apparent. This puts to rest what is being claimed by this man
without understanding the meaning of what he uses for evidence
He [Ibn al-Qayyim] also said: “The one who is nearest to being right
when the Ulema are in dispute is he who adheres to Allah’s command [[refer
it to Allah and the Messenger]
(4:59)] and refer to the Qur’an and the Sunna whatever over which they
dispute. As for whoever refers the matter to the one he follows exclusively of
others, then how can he be closer to being right?”
This is worthless sophistry. It is those who are in dispute who are commanded to refer to Allah Most High and the Messenger, Allah bless and greet him. So when the Ulema dispute it is incumbent upon them to refer to Allah Most High and the Messenger, Allah bless and greet him. But if the ignorant dispute, such as the muqallid and other than the muqallid, then their referring to Allah Most High and the Messenger, Allah bless and greet him, cannot take place except through referral to the ‘âlim who knows the Book and the Sunna – not to the Book and the Sunna themselves, for they are ignorant of them. Else, it would necessarily follow that the ignoramus is the arbiter among the Ulema, and nothing is more patently false than such a claim. It is all-too-apparent that what he said is pure sophistry, and it stems from failing to meditate on the Qur’an.
Ibn al-Qayyim wrote extensively on tasawwuf with which he evidently felt strong affinities. He wrote an extensive commentary on al-Harawi al-Ansari’s slim Sufi manual entitled Manazil al-Sa’irin ila al-Haqq which he named Madarij al-Salikin and in which he says:
Religion is all moral character (khuluq), and whoever bests you in moral character, bests you in Religion. It is the same with tasawwuf. Al-Kattani said: Tasawwuf is moral character, and whoever bests you in moral character, bests you in Religion…. Truly, the hardest thing for human nature is the modification of the moral qualities and traits with which the selves have been stamped. Those who earnestly engaged in harsh discipline and arduous strivings worked on nothing else. Most of them did not succeed in changing the self, but the latter became fully employed in those exercises and thus unable to wield its influence…. One day I asked Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya – may Allah have mercy on him! – about this matter and how to eliminate defects and occupy oneself with the cleansing of one’s path. The gist of his reply was that the self is like a garbage pile: the more you dig in it, the more of it comes out to the surface; if you can pave a pathway over it and go past it, do so, and do not preoccupy yourself with digging into it for you shall never reach its bottom!…. Tasawwuf is one of the cornerstones (zawâyâ) of true wayfaring (al-sulûk al-haqîqî) and the purification and disciplining of the self (tazkiya al-nafs wa tahdhîbuhâ) so that it may prepare itself for its journey to the company of the Highest Assembly and for being together with its beloved. For “One is with the one he loves” as Sumnun stated: “The lovers of Allah have gained the honor of both the world and the hereafter, for ‘he is with the one he loves.” And Allah knows best.
Sources: Reliance p. 1058.
See posting titled, “Allah is now as He ever was,” toward the end.
Cf. Albani’s remark in his notes on al-Alusi al-Ayat al-Bayyinat (p. 22): “See the book al-Ruh attributed to Ibn al-Qayyim, for it contains the strangest and oddest narrations and opinions”! But there is virtually nothing in al-Ruh which cannot also be found or confirmed in al-Qurtubi’s al-Tadhkira, Ibn Rajab’s Ahwal al-Qubur, ‘Abd al-Haqq ibn al-Kharrat’s al-‘Aqiba, al-Suyuti’s Sharh al-Sudur, Ibn Abi al-Dunya’s al-Qubur, etc. See “The Hearing of the Dead” from Kitab al-Ruh at http://sunnah.org/aqida/index.htm.
Al-Dhahabi (d. 748) in al-Mu‘jam al-Mukhtass bi al-Muhaddithin (fo 145), al-Safadi (d. 764) in A‘yan al-‘Asr (fo 129) and al-Wafi bi al-Wafayat (2:170-172), al-Husayni (d. 765) in Dhayl al-‘Ibar (5:282), Ibn Kathir (d. 774) in al-Bidaya wa al-Nihaya (14:234), Ibn Rafi‘ (d. 774) in al-Wafayat (2:6-7), Ibn Rajab (d. 795) in Dhayl Tabaqat al-Hanabila (2:447), Ibn Nasir al-Din (d. 842) in al-Radd al-Wafir (p. 68), Ibn Hajar (d. 852) in al-Durar al-Kamina (3:400), al-Biqa‘i (d. 885) in Sirr al-Ruh (introduction), etc.
“We mentioned this in our large book, Ma‘rifa al-Ruh wa al-Nafs…” Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Ruh (1975 ed. p. 38=1998 ed. p. 125).
Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Ruh (1975 ed. p. 37=1998 ed. p. 122).
Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Ruh (1975 ed. p. 83=1998 ed. p. 227).
Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Ruh (1975 ed. p. 45=1998 ed. p. 141).
Ibn Taymiyya, Majmu‘a al-Fatawa (5:438).
“This is a position rejected by the Book, the Sunna, the Consensus of the Companions, as well as the evidence given by reason, common sense, and primordial nature, and is the position of one who does not know his own soul let alone the souls of others.” Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Ruh (1975 ed. p. 111=1998 ed. p. 286).
Ibrahim al-Nakha‘i as cited by Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani in al-Jami‘ fi al-Sunan (p. 150 #18).
As cited by Dr. Salah al-Sawi in his al-Thawabit wa al-Mutaghayyirat (Cairo: al-Muntada al-Islami, 1994) p. 66.
Included in full in his Fawa’id fi ‘Ulum al-Fiqh in the second volume of the general introduction to al-Tahanawi’s I‘la’ al-Sunan (2:1-99). This epistle is probably the most comprehensive rebuttal of “Salafi” anti-madhhabism.
Ibn al-Qayyim, I‘lam al-Muwaqqi‘in (Dar al-Jil ed. 2:273).
Zakariyya ibn Yahya al-Darir said to Imam Ahmad: “How many memorized hadiths are sufficient for someone to be a mufti? Are one hundred thousand sufficient?” He said no. “Two hundred thousand?” He said no. “Three?” He said no, until Zakariyya said: “Five hundred thousand?” Ahmad said: “I hope that that should be sufficient.” Al-Dhahabi, Siyar (9:469=al-Arna’ut ed. 11:232).
See Ibn al-Salah’s Adab al-Mufti wa al-Mustafti at the beginning of his Fatawa wa Masa’il (1:5-133).
“He [Ibn al-Mubarak] did not give fatwa except upon strength and on the basis of transmitted reports.” ‘Ali ibn al-Husayn ibn Shaqiq as cited by Ibn Abi Hatim in his introduction to al-Jarh wa al-Ta‘dil (p. 262).
This reasoning is at the origin of the invented terminology of “Salafis” whereby one “should be a muttabi‘ and not a muqallid,” and their barefaced prohibition of taqlîd as reported of ‘Eid ‘Abbasi by al-Buti in al-Lamadhhabiyya (p. 99-108).
Ibn al-Qayyim, op.cit.
Ibn al-Qayyim, op.cit.
Al-Kiranawi, al-Din al-Qayyim in the second volume of the general introduction to al-Tahanawi’s I‘la’ al-Sunan (2:62-63).
A mass-transmitted hadith
of the Prophet, Allah bless and greet him, narrated from fifteen Companions
– as stated by al-Kattani in Nazm al-Mutanathir – in the Nine Books.
Ibn al-Qayyim, Madarij al-Salikin (2:307).